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Abstract: Despite the territorial demise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS], their cyberoperations
continue to entice supporters. In an effort to disrupt ISIS’s appeal, the International Center for the Study of
Violent Extremism has produced over 180 short video clips featuring ISIS insiders denouncing the group,
published in over 150 Facebook campaigns in multiple languages and regions. This article details 16
campaigns hyper-targeted at profiles that, based on predetermined and assessed indicators, suggested
increased risk of exposure to ISIS-related content. Qualitative and quantitative metrics possibly suggest
positive changes in online attitudes and behavior, reducing support and incitement to terrorism.
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1. Introduction
In Syria and Iraq, where ISIS once held significant swaths of
territories and managed to attract up to 40,000 foreign fight-
ers to its Caliphate, the group has been declared territorially
defeated. ISIS continues to operate in both countries, how-
ever, mounting low-level attacks on a weekly basis and con-
tinuing to attract new recruits globally [1]. Despite territorial
defeat in Iraq and Syria, and as part of its recruitment strat-
egy, ISIS remains firm in promoting and disseminating core
narratives of militant jihadist ideology, while also signaling a
new era of protracted insurgency-style attacks—biding time
until they can reformulate their now lost Caliphate [2]. Some
authors have stressed that the recent video appearances
on social media of the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is
an example of such, as it serves to project “the appearance
that he is secure, calm, and confident, despite years of
major military powers bombarding ISIS-controlled land and
infrastructure in Iraq and Syria” [3]. Similarly, in Baghouz,
one of its last strongholds in Syria, ISIS urged its follow-
ers to remain resolute in the face of military advancement
against the group [4].
The group also continues to exploit the allure of the Is-
lamic State, albeit in retreat, as a utopian ideal, revered for
generations to come, as well as portray itself as victorious,
with “Allah’s help,” despite ravaged social, political, and war
conditions from which it managed to emerge and survive.
ISIS propagandists tout the group and its terrorist activi-
ties as able to convey purpose, significance, value, and
self-esteem to those who join. For instance, in a Septem-
ber 2019 purported audio recording, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
urged his followers to continue attacks and storm prisons
and camps holding ISIS prisoners and their families. In the
same audio recording, he urged his supporters to “teach
Muslims about the Islamic State’s struggle and not forget
the followers who held out until the Caliphate’s final weeks”
c© 2020 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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[5]. Indeed, many ISIS cadres featured in ISIS propaganda
during their last stand in Syria appeared unwilling to ac-
cept the then looming defeat in Baghouz and denying its
significance. Others tried to turn the defeat around. They
taunted what they referred to as the humiliating legacy of
the international community in allowing ISIS members to
be targeted for their belief in the Islamic State and Islamic
laws. The group also decried the international community
for failing to take responsibility for the scores of women and
children who died in Baghouz under U.S.-led coalition and
others’ air bombardments [6].
On Facebook, Twitter and YouTube—and lately on small-
to-mid-sized and micro platforms, some even run by single
individuals—ISIS and other terrorist groups continue to re-
cruit, inspire, and attract those willing to answer their call to
violence [7]. To a varying degree, it is in such platforms that
a significant number of online users—potential would-be ter-
rorist, religious scholars, ideologues, recruiters, promoters,
propagandists, and affiliated and unaffiliated sympathiz-
ers—continue to group together to form ISIS’ online support
community and aid its propaganda distribution and continue
spinning its narratives that are critical to both its short and
long-term sustainment.
While ISIS propagandists continue to churn out and
distribute dangerous content, governments and social me-
dia companies struggle with takedown efforts to prevent
violent extremist and terrorist exploitation of social media
platforms and the Internet. For instance, in 2018, Facebook
reportedly voluntarily removed 14.3 million pieces of violent
content tied to extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda.
Only 41,000 pieces of the total were flagged by external
sources, namely by regular Facebook users [8]. Facebook
took down the rest. Despite take-down policies, coupled
with the fact that its propaganda production has shrunk
considerably, violent extremist content produced by groups
such as ISIS remains accessible and sharable online, par-
ticularly in languages other than English. In addition, some
experts from both the private and governmental sectors
have criticized over reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) to
detect and remove online extremist content. In fact, such
experts render efforts to detect and remove online extrem-
ist content without human interaction and moderation of
limited utility [9]. Indeed, relying on intel and open source
intelligence (OSINT) techniques, in the course of a 30-day
campaign, ICSVE researchers were recently able to identify
more than 500 Facebook accounts in Arabic, Albanian, En-
glish and Turkish that openly promoted, shared, endorsed
or actively discussed ISIS material and/or supported anti-
Western and pro-ISIS ideologies. The researchers also
found professionally produced propaganda videos and ma-
terials, both old and new, distributed over Facebook that
continue to attract ISIS sympathizers and followers online
[10].
To counter violent extremist group ideologies and narra-
tives, ICSVE researchers have spent the last three years
in-depth video interviewing over 240–ISIS and al Shabaab,
male and female, adult and juvenile–returnees, defectors,
and imprisoned cadres. Their research and interviews fo-
cus on understanding individual motivations and pathways
into and out of terrorism, experiences inside the group, and
reasons for leaving, if defected from the group, and disillu-
sionment and feelings now about the group. From these in-
depth video interviews, ICSVE researchers have produced
over 180 short counter narrative video clips featuring actual
ISIS and al Shabaab members and their family members
as they discuss their experiences inside the group and de-
nounce it for its utterly un-Islamic, corrupt and brutal nature,
while warning others not to join. Facebook has collaborated
with ICSVE researchers to distribute these video clips, sub-
titled in the 27 languages in which ISIS recruits, in over 150
broad online awareness raising and prevention campaigns
to counter the group’s online presence, propaganda, and
recruiting efforts. These counter narratives comprise the
Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project, which
has been the basis for various studies of the efficacy of
counter narratives in engaging different populations both
online and in face-to-face focus groups. Furthermore, in
cooperation with Facebook, ICSVE researchers have also
been able to target the same critical groups that ISIS itself
is successfully reaching: Populations specifically believed
to be at risk for exposure to those distributing ISIS materials
or who repeatedly referenced a direct support for ISIS on
Facebook.
This article reports on ICSVE’s primary research and
efforts to target and intervene in multiple Facebook cam-
paigns online; hyper-targeted to samples of Facebook pro-
files judged to be at risk for radicalization based on expo-
sure to militant jihadi-driven (ISIS, al-Qaeda, al Shabaab)
violent extremist content and rhetoric on Facebook. The
purpose of the campaigns was to engage target audiences
with ICSVE-produced counter narratives and discern their
impact utilizing a set of awareness, engagement, and im-
pact metrics. Between November 7, 2018, and December 7,
2018, ICSVE researchers ran 16 campaigns on Facebook
using 10 ICSVE-produced counter narratives (See Table
1). The reporting on these hyper-targeted ICSVE-run cam-
paigns on Facebook, among the 144th campaign to date
run by ICSVE on Facebook, provides unique insights into a
large and important data set. This data set consists of users
who were selected based on signals that gave evidence
that they were at risk of exposure to those distributing ISIS
materials or who had referenced a direct support for ISIS
on Facebook—hence a population deemed as “vulnerable”
to terrorist recruitment and exposure.
A number of ethical matters were considered with re-
spect to this campaign. ICSVE researchers did not directly
interact with any Facebook users, therefore there was no
necessity of proclaiming the research purpose of the cam-
paign. Moreover, ICSVE did not receive the names of the
people targeted in the campaigns, only the mechanisms
by which they were selected. As such, Facebook did not
breach the privacy of these users by sharing any of their
information with ICSVE. Similarly, the only names ICSVE
was able to obtain were the Facebook names, which may
17
or may not be the users’ legal names, of people who com-
mented on the videos. It can be assumed that Facebook
users understand that commenting on a video means that
others will be able to see their names, essentially making
their comments open-source, observational data. Still, the
users did not consent to having their names published in
a research article, therefore no names are revealed in this
article.
ICSVE targeted campaigns reported in this article was
carried out in German, English, French, Turkish, Dutch,
Arabic, Albanian, Swahili, and Bengali speaking Facebook
accounts. International Center for the Study of Violent Ex-
tremism selected these languages and region based upon
ISIS and al Shabaab recruitment activity in such languages
and regions. International Center for the Study of Violent
Extremism identified countries such as Turkey, France, and
Belgium, and multi-country and regional areas such as
the Middle East and Africa using a common language as
specific targeting criteria. Certain counter narratives tar-
geted certain populations based on a combination of both
availability of counter narratives and content that ICSVE
researchers believed would more profoundly resonate with
the target audience. For instance, ICSVE selected counter
narratives depicting local Iraqi and Arab ISIS cadres for use
in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and neighboring countries, while
using counter narratives featuring European defectors in
Germany (See Table 1).
2. Campaign Type and Methodology
Online campaigns against ISIS and other terrorist groups
typically fall into one or more of three distinct categories.
Each campaign type has a different goal, though a single
campaign may have multiple goals. Counter narratives,
discussed in this article, are campaigns that aim to dis-
rupt, discredit and refute the narratives put forth by terrorist
groups, causing viewers to question the truthfulness of the
messages they receive from terrorist groups online. In
contrast, alternative narratives promote the positive, proso-
cial elements of democratic society, emphasizing values
of tolerance and freedom rather than decrying the terrorist
group’s antisocial values. Alternative narratives can fall flat
if viewers have not personally experienced the benefits of
democratic society promoted in the alternative narrative and
have been discriminated against or marginalized in such a
society. Finally, government strategic communications are
campaigns put forth overtly by government entities, aiming
to raise awareness of positive government action and cor-
rect misinformation that may be disseminated in terrorist
propaganda. However, those most vulnerable to terrorist
recruitment may be already predisposed not to trust the
government due to real or perceived discrimination or ha-
rassment and subsequent disillusionment with society and
negative attitudes toward government in general [11]. All
of ICSVE’s campaigns are counter narratives, and the fo-
cus in the campaigns discussed presently was on reaching
Facebook accounts that ICSVE judged as vulnerable to
exposure to terrorist propaganda and rhetoric. These cam-
paigns stand in contrast to previously ICSVE initiated cam-
paigns where the focus was on targeting general Facebook
populations and accounts in an effort to raise or increase
awareness about the dangers of joining ISIS and similar
terrorist groups using ISIS insider counter narratives. The
present focus thus differed on narrowing the targeting of the
campaigns to profiles judged to be more vulnerable individ-
uals, namely those already in contact with ISIS recruiters
and influencers on Facebook and those deemed most likely
to be themselves targets of ISIS recruitment efforts. The
profiles targeted in these campaigns had also been at one
time in contact with those who were distributing violent ex-
tremist content and showing direct support and/or strong
sympathy for the militant jihadi violent extremist cause. The
campaigns thus specifically targeted Facebook accounts
that were likely to be under the influence of propagators
of violent extremist ideologies, such as those propagated
by ISIS or al Shabaab. The target populations may have
included persons who may have progressed further in the
grooming process and extremism trajectory due to these
exposures.
Internet-based awareness campaigns are crucial to un-
derstanding how individuals can be radicalized and mobi-
lized to violence. In contrast, more focused and targeted
campaigns allow us to not only identify and directly en-
gage with accounts that may show support for a violent
extremist cause, but also monitor and analyze online be-
havior, and possibly discern shifts in offline attitude(s) and
behaviors and also have a positive impact on negative on-
line behaviors [12]. To date, only a few organizations have
mounted online Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) cam-
paigns in an effort to thwart the influence of groups such
as ISIS. Some among them have also managed to target
their efforts at vulnerable audiences versus only the general
population. Table 2 contains a list of major CVE online cam-
paigns, broken down by their type of messaging, strategic
objectives, and outcomes (See Table 2).
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Table 1. Counter narrative campaign content.
Country Language Campaign Date Counter Narrative
Germany German Nov. 8- Dec. 8, 2018 “Promises of ad dawlah to women”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrM7ykImq00
Turkey & Europe Turkish Aug. 13-Sept. 13, 2018 “Marriage in the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XF7xDypwZsE
Turkey Turkish Nov. 7-Dec. 7, 2018 “Promises of ad dawlah to women”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgLhJezcpKY
Turkey Turkish Nov. 7-Dec. 7, 2018 “Rewards of joining the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnOgd9YxvF4&list=PLqpy96DXqN-cOJxe2PdPIYKvt80fKBvo7&index=5&t=2s
Trinidad & Tobago English Nov. 7-Dec. 7, 2018 “A Belgian family in the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=phZsHWBzcbE
Trinidad & Tobago English Nov. 7-Dec. 7, 2018 “Rewards of joining the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kHwyGLI5JQ&list=PLqpy96DXqN-dK01K FikteDoSxScG OT0&index=20
France French Nov. 7-Dec. 7, 2018 “Rewards of joining the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-1D VfLwLuo
France & Belgium French Aug. 14-Sept. 14, 2018 “Dreams of the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5FRWCDAAo M&list=PLqpy96DXqNdBJreHM kN4Tu 0BAIotGp&index=8
U. A. E. Arabic Aug. 25-Nov. 1, 2018 “Rewards of joining the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kHwyGLI5JQ&list=PLqpy96DXqN-dK01K FikteDoSxScG OT0&index=20
Iraq & Lebanon Arabic Aug. 25-Sept. 25, 2018 “Swearing bayat for IS in Fallujah”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KAF28 E Fo
The Netherlands Dutch Aug. 14-Nov. 1, 2018 “Justice in the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jFcq8N es8E
Albania & Europe Albanian Aug. 14-Nov. 1, 2018 “Rewards of joining the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bXHtMBftjMs&list=PLqpy96DXqN-cXB99Yl9P zWxWlGCay1G4&index=27&t=2s
Kenya Swahili Aug. 14-Sept. 14, 2018 “The lioness and the lion of IS”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bwXPAeP40J8&list=PLqpy96DXqN-dVuL6Z6Clxdhc2FSwkRGIn&index=1
Middle East & North Africa (Libya,
Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar,
Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt)
Arabic Aug. 13-Sept. 13, 2018 “My brother in the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=928WFV68zJw&list=PLqpy96DXqN-ecauObr9dAj7ijLjk7iW Z&index=14
Africa & Europe (Uganda, Zambia,
Mozambique, South Africa, Nigeria,
Kenya, UK, New Zealand, US)
English Aug. 13-Sept. 13, 2018 “Rewards of joining the Islamic State”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kHwyGLI5JQ&list=PLqpy96DXqN-dK01K FikteDoSxScG OT0&index=20
Bangladesh Bengali Aug. 14-Sept. 14, 2018 “The knights of the Caliphate”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFMUgk t1XA&list=PLqpy96DXqNdK01K FikteDoSxScG OT0&index=11
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Table 2. Online campaigns and outcomes: Messaging, strategy, and objectives.
Campaign Name Year Type of Messaging Objective Platform and Target Evaluation
Extreme Dialogue 2016 Counter & alternative
narrative
General awareness
raising campaign using a
series of short videos
Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube users,
advertising
Video views, comment
analysis, likes & shares,
platform comparisons
Average Mohammed 2016 Counter & alternative
narrative
Animated counter
narrative videos used to
target extremist ideology
Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube users
Reach vs. engagement
cross platform
comparison, comment
analysis
One-to-One Pilot
Study
2014 Counter & alternative
narrative
An online campaign
seeking to diminish
support for Islamist or
supremacist cause
Facebook Comment analysis; direct
responses or shifts in
online behavior recorded
One-to-One
(Follow-Up Study)
2018 Counter & alternative
narrative
Former extremists
engaged and sent
messages to 800+
accounts that showed
support for Islamist or
supremacist cause
Facebook Response rate,
engagement, comment
analysis; shifts in online
behavior recorded
Say No to Terrorism 2013 Counter & alternative
narrative
Videos posted to counter
extremism in Saudi
Arabia
Facebook & YouTube
users
Video views, comments,
analysis
Redirect method 2015-
current
Counter & alternative
narrative
Redirecting ISIS
supporters and
sympathizers to anti-ISIS
video playlists
YouTube Impressions, clicks,
click-through-rate (CTR)
Breaking the ISIS
Brand Counter
narrative Project
2017 Counter narrative General awareness
raising campaigns using
ISIS defector videos to
counter extremism in Iraq
Facebook users,
advertising
Video views, viewer
retention, video shares,
likes, comment analysis
Breaking the ISIS
Brand Counter
narrative Project –
Jordan
2018 Counter narrative General awareness
raising campaign using
ISIS defector videos to
counter extremism
Facebook users in
Jordan, advertising
Video views, viewer
retention, video shares,
likes, comment analysis;
Users redirected to
ICSVE “The Real Jihad,”
suggesting further
engagement and interest
in the project
Breaking the ISIS
Brand – Facebook
English Speakers
2018 Counter narrative General awareness
raising campaign using
ISIS defector videos to
counter extremism
English Facebook users,
advertising
Video views, video
shares, viewer retention,
likes, comment analysis
Breaking the ISIS
Brand – English &
Albanian Facebook
Accounts
2017 Counter narrative ISIS defector videos
posted to counter
accounts that suggested
sharing, liking, or
sympathizing with ISIS
material
English & Albanian
Facebook users
Video shares, likes,
comment analysis
Harakat ut-Taleem 2016 Counter & alternative
narrative
Videos depicting former
extremists’ testimonial
and dramatization of
events to dissuade the
youth from joining the
Taliban in Pakistan and
offer alternative
viewpoints
Facebook users in
Pakistan, Twitter,
YouTube
Views, viewer retention,
comment analysis
EXIT USA Ongo-
ing
Counter & alternative
narratives
Testimonials highlighting
the experiences of former
extremists to counter
far-right extremism
YouTube, Facebook,
Twitter
Video views, viewer
retention, comment
analysis; Eight engaged
in sustained engagement,
contacted the campaign
organizers to discuss
violent extremism and
deradicalization
Author review of literature. The endnotes contain references to the material cited in the table.
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2.1. Geographic Location and Demographic Information
Males constituted a majority in the targeted sample across
all 16 campaigns, as they were more likely to appear in our
hyper-targeted sample based on the algorithm used to iden-
tify them as potentially vulnerable to a terrorist propaganda
distributor. In addition, 18-34-year-olds, across both male
and female age categories, were the most reached group.
Similarly, ICSVE chose that age group because they were
more likely to fall into the targeted sample. For instance,
the campaign targeting Germany included 467 male and
108 female accounts in the 18-34-year-olds category, while
Iraq and Lebanon included 12,064 male and 552 females in
the same category (See Table 3 for a sample breakdown).
The samples in each country/region were far smaller than in
previous ICSVE campaigns given that the hyper-targeting
only focused on those deemed vulnerable to ISIS and al
Shabaab propagandists as opposed to previous sampling
based on age, gender, key words, and so forth.
Table 3. Sample cemographic breakdown.
Country Age Category
Male
Age Category
Female
Reach
Germany 18-24 (221);
25-34 (246)
18-24 (54);
25-34 (54)
3,536
Turkey &
Europe
18-24 (245);
25-34 (275)
18-24 (33) 3,921
Turkey 18-24 (151);
25-34 (152)
25-34 (45) 7,320
Iraq &
Lebanon
18-24 (6,836);
25-34 (5,228)
18-24 (284);
25-34 (263)
15,543
Kenya 18-24 (106);
25-34 (288)
18-24 (185);
25-34 (263)
1,065
3. Results
One of the objectives of these Facebook campaigns was to
engage those at risk for exposure to terrorist propaganda
with ICSVE produced counter narratives. Secondary to that
objective was to engage the viewers to click on the ICSVE
YouTube channel in the language being used in the counter
narrative campaign, or, if operating in English, Arabic or
Albanian, to click through to the ICSVE TheRealJihad.org
website. The Real Jihad is a repository of counter narrative
videos, written materials, and links to helpful organizations
for prevention of and exiting from extremism. A number of
variables were used to measure whether these objectives
were reached. The goal in both objectives was to initiate
engagement and possibly discern behavioral shifts, both on-
line and offline, among the target audiences. The campaign
results were analyzed in terms of awareness, engagement,
and impact metrics derived from industry best practices and
the authors’ research in conducting targeted interventions
online (See Figure 1).
The campaigns generated a total reach of 118, 559, and
51, 686 video views at 3, 25, 50, 70, and 100 percent video
watches (See Table 4). The reach metric gives a measure
of how many people could have seen the counter narra-
tives, or how many individuals the video could potentially
reach, depending on ad placement and targeting criteria
used. The metric is not an estimate of how many people
actually watched the counter narratives, but rather on how
many people’s Facebook feeds the counter narrative ad
appeared, giving the person the possibility of exposure to it.
Those reached may not always click on the ads; however, a
good reach metric increases the likelihood of more persons
engaging with it when they see it.
Table 4. Overview of results.
Country Objective Reach Video
Watches
(>3 seconds)
Video
Watches
(>75%)
Germany Traffic TRJ 3,536 1,359 512
Turkey &
Europe
Traffic
YouTube
3,921 2,169 926
Turkey Traffic TRJ 7,320 437 121
Turkey Traffic TRJ 13,113 5,161 1,530
Trinidad &
Tobago
Traffic TRJ 83 156 66
Trinidad &
Tobago
Traffic TRJ 76 79 29
France Traffic TRJ 10,158 5,947 2,254
France &
Belgium
Traffic
YouTube
4,840 1,610 640
U.A.E. Traffic
YouTube
3,932 1,378 474
Iraq &
Lebanon
Traffic
YouTube
15,543 13,481 5,080
The
Netherlands
Traffic TRJ 736 235 86
Albania &
Europe
Traffic
YouTube
3,022 3,869 1,690
Kenya Traffic TRJ 1,065 660 249
Middle East
& North
Africa
Traffic
YouTube
40,792 12,242 4,048
Africa &
Europe
Traffic TRJ 4,410 1,761 617
Bangladesh Traffic TRJ 5,962 1,141 478
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Figure 1. Data analysis framework.
ICSVE utilized the following video engagement metrics
to analyze the data:
• Video view rate: The percentage of the users who
viewed the counter narratives and watched them for
more than 3 seconds. International Center for the
Study of Violent Extremism calculated this metric as
Total Views/Impressions. Note that total video view
refers to the number of times a user viewed a counter
narrative for 3 seconds and more. For instance, in the
case of Germany: 1,359 Total views/44, 100 impres-
sions=3.1% (See Table 5).
• Seventy-five, 95 and 100 percent View
Rate—Percentage of users who viewed our counter
narratives and watched them for 75, 95, and 100
percent of the length: The metric is calculated as 75,
95, 100 % Views/Total Views. For instance, in the
case of Turkey: 1,530/5,161=29 % (See Table 5).
• Complete View Rate—Percentage the viewers who
watched the entire counter narrative: The metric is cal-
culated as Complete Views/Total views. For instance,
in the case of France and Belgium: 120/1,899=6.3 %
(See Table 5).
Table 5. Video engagement metrics.
Country Video View
Rate (%)
% of users
who viewed
and
watched
>75%
Complete
View Rate
(%)
Germany 3.1 37 37
Turkey & Europe 4.6 42 5.9
Turkey 1.7 27 4.5
Turkey 1.3 29 4.7
Trinidad &
Tobago
4.7 42 7.6
Trinidad &
Tobago
7.6 36 3.8
France 4.1 37 4.5
France &
Belgium
3.3 39 7.4
U.A.E. 1.6 34 7.9
Iraq & Lebanon 3.2 37 4.8
The Netherlands 2.2 36 5.5
Albania &
Europe
2.9 43 9.2
Kenya 2.7 37 7.2
Middle East &
North Africa
1.5 33 5.4
Africa & Europe 3.3 35 5.5
Bangladesh 1.7 41 6.8
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Video engagement metrics are significant when con-
sidering the relatively low audience sample size across all
16 campaigns. For instance, there are significant video
watches at 75, 95, and 100 percent watches relative to au-
diences reached, especially in the case of Turkey, France,
Iraq & Lebanon, the Middle East and North Africa (See Ta-
ble 4). In addition, the complete view rate is relatively high
in the Netherlands, U.A.E., Albania, Europe, and Trinidad
& Tobago campaigns, while the view rate (75, 95, and 100
percent) stands above 30 percent across all campaigns
(See Table 5).
As discussed earlier, reach refers to Facebook users
who see ICSVE Facebook ad post and who might watch
the counter narrative video. To answer the question of
how many of them actually watch and for how long, a post
“engagement funnel” can demonstrate engagement graphi-
cally (See Figure 2) using the case of targeting in Iraq and
Lebanon [13].
The percentage of viewers, who, after watching the 10-
second mark (10-second video views), decided to watch
the counter narrative until the end was also calculated. This
metric gives us a general idea of how engaging the rest
of our counter narrative content was after the 10-second
watch point. Facebook recommends 7-10 seconds as base-
lines for capturing target audience’s attention [14]. ICSVE
used the following formula to compute the metric: Complete
Views/10-second Video Views. For instance, in the case
of Germany: 62/1,759=3.5 percent. This means that 3.5
percent of the 10-second viewers watched the counter nar-
rative until the end. The numbers were much higher in the
case of Trinidad & Tobago, the Netherlands and the Albania
& Europe campaigns (See Table 6).
The average watch time across all 16, campaign is 10.5
seconds, indicating that users took in at least some of the
counter narrative messaging. Given that the target audi-
ences are likely to have already been exposed, and possibly
positively inclined, to terrorist propaganda, many may have
stopped watching after realizing it was a denunciation of
a terrorist group. The low average watch time may also
reflect the fact that the target audiences expressed disinter-
est in the counter narratives, rejected them, or objected to
the length of the video. In addition, by social media stan-
dards, any video watch of 10 seconds or more indicates
a high level of engagement, which is a positive of sorts.
In most campaigns, traffic to ICSVE’s TheRealJihad.org
and YouTube channel was chosen as an objective in or-
der to send the viewer to the sites with far more counter
narrative and CVE materials, which could also explain the
low average watch time—that rather than watch the whole
video, they clicked through for further content on these
sites. In other words, many may have migrated to either
TheRealJihad.org or YouTube channel after seeing the ad
on Facebook for further engagement (See Table 7 under
“Landing Page (LP) views”)[15,16].
Figure 2. Engagement funnel example: Iraq and Lebanon.
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Table 6. Video engagement metrics.
Country Complete
Views
10-Second
Views
% Watched
until the end
Germany 62 1,759 3.5
Turkey & Europe 129 1,688 7.6
Turkey 20 1,009 1.9
Turkey 244 11,404 2.1
Trinidad &
Tobago
12 147 8.1
Trinidad &
Tobago
3 87 9.2
France 269 6,405 4.2
France &
Belgium
120 1,899 6.3
U.A.E. 109 2,529 4.3
Iraq & Lebanon 659 15,222 4.3
The Netherlands 38 453 8.3
Albania &
Europe
358 5,241 6.8
Kenya 48 842 5.2
Middle East &
North Africa
663 22,218 2.9
Africa & Europe 97 2,129 4.5
Bangladesh 78 2,737 2.8
The frequency metric ranged from low 3.55 to high 42.98
(See Table 7). Facebook calculates the frequency metric as
impressions divided by reach and refers to the average num-
ber of times each person in the targeted sample saw the ad.
The high frequency rate across all the campaigns reflects
ad targeting and placement criteria set to build recall and
awareness by showing the counter narratives in the target
audience’s Facebook feed multiple times. This level of ad opti-
mization is important in the case of the target audiences due
to the “self-selective” nature of social media content. Social
media content is self-selective because individuals choose
which content to consume. Thus, with more exposures, they
are more likely to click on and watch the content. Optimization
is also important due to the fluidity of social media information,
as the rapid flow of information on Facebook can reduce the
accuracy of exposure recall [12].
Many of the previous ICSVE campaigns were optimized
for ad creatives and targeting criteria to ensure that the same
individuals are not seeing the ads too often during a campaign.
This was necessary to avoid audience fatigue and risk the
prospect of interaction with the ad and the counter narratives
in the process. In these campaign samples, which were much
smaller, limiting exposure was not possible, thus risking pos-
sible oversaturation, while also increasing the likelihood that
more exposure would mean that target audiences would ei-
ther click on the video itself or migrate to ICSVE’s YouTube
channel or TheRealJihad.org website for further engagement
and interactions.
Link clicks refer to the number of click on links within an
ad that takes the target audience on or off Facebook. For
example, an individual click on a link that takes a user to an
external website or to a video posted by another website, such
as YouTube, is considered a link click. Unique click refers to a
metric that counts people, not actions, who performed a link
click, so we may have 100 link clicks but only 90 unique clicks
(See Table 7). The unique clicks are less relative to link clicks,
as they measure the number of people who performed an
action on the ad. In this example, 90 unique clicks led to 100
link clicks, meaning some users performed multiple clicks.
The landing page views metric measures the number of
times a person clicked on the ad that successfully led him or
her to a desired destination page (TheRealJihad.org or the
ICSVE YouTube channel). This metric is useful in discerning
the extent to which ICSVE fulfilled the secondary objective
of the research, namely sending the viewers to either the
ICSVE’s TheRealJihad.org website or the full YouTube playlist
of ICSVE counter narrative videos in their viewing language.
While the number of link clicks within an ad remains important
for measuring engagement on the ads or post, the landing
page view metric is a better indicator of quality clicks that
landed the target audience to a desired destination page the
ICSVE’s TheRealJihad.org or YouTube channel.
Click-Through-Rate (CTR), calculated as clicks divided by
impressions and expressed as a percentage, is a campaign
performance metric used to measure the effectiveness of a
campaign “Learn More” button leading to TheRealJihad.org,
YouTube; Facebook display ad, For example, in the case of
France and Belgium, CTR rate stands at 0.9 percent. This
number is promising, as average CTR rate for Facebook ads
across all industries stands at 0.9 percent [14]. In the case
of Trinidad and Tobago and Turkey, it stands at 2.5 and 1.7
percent, respectively, still well above industry expectations.
As also reflected in Table 7, the CTR rates across all 16
campaigns ranges from 0.6 to 2.5 percent.
CTR is an important metric, as it calculates how many
individuals among the target audience actually end up clicking
on an ad after seeing it, thus migrating to the desired site, as
predetermined by ICSVE researchers, for further counter nar-
rative exposure in this case. CTR is an important indicator of
how relevant the ads were to the target audience and it deter-
mines ad engagement rate (quality score). That said, the type
of content presented in the counter narrative and the nature
of target audience has a bearing on CTR rate. In other words,
the controversial nature of the counter narrative content in the
eyes of the viewers may have affected their motivations to take
the desired action. The CTR rate might be further increased
by improving performance of the components it is designed
to track, including the wording of the ad, imagery, content,
video length, subject lines, links to external and landing pages
[14]. Despite low CTR rates in certain campaigns, such as
in the case of Iraq & Lebanon and Albania & Europe, clicks
on Facebook with URL tags were also monitored. The use
of a Google Analytics monitoring tool revealed a significant
number of visits to ICSVE’s TheRealJihag.org and YouTube
channel in response to a specific ad posted on our end (See
Table 7 under “Link clicks” and “Landing Page (LP) views”).
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Table 7. Overview of results.
Country Link Clicks Unique Clicks LP Views Frequency Impressions CTR (%)
Germany 739 574 287 12.47 44,100 1.7
Turkey & Europe 777 578 63 11.93 46,578 1.7
Turkey 437 392 131 3.55 25,966 1.7
Turkey 5,161 3,446 1,276 29.39 385,450 1.3
Trinidad & Tobago 52 25 15 40.01 3,321 1.6
Trinidad & Tobago 26 13 8 13.58 1,032 2.5
France 2,116 1,701 979 14.13 143,496 1.5
France & Belgium 444 387 25 10.00 48,396 0.9
U.A.E. 295 212 24 21.54 84,690 0.3
Iraq & Lebanon 1,545 1,196 9 26.66 414,339 0.4
The Netherlands 119 125 NA 13.97 10,280 1.2
Albania & Europe 820 543 24 42.98 129,896 0.6
Kenya 325 233 NA 22.54 24,004 1.4
Middle East & North Africa 4,822 3,990 36 19.86 810,300 0.6
Africa & Europe 930 930 731 11.84 52,232 1.8
Bangladesh 518 394 9 11.51 68,621 0.8
3.1. Engagement, Comments and Impact Analysis
Engagement metrics serve to better quantify volume and
the types of interaction with the counter narratives, while
comments analysis (also an engagement subset category),
offers insight into how the target audience responded to
the counter narratives. Impact analysis includes a measur-
able change in the target audience behavior both offline
and online, such as sustained engagements online, taking
conversation offline, contacting ICSVE for help or additional
referrals, clicking “Learn More” or “Call to Action” buttons
leading to external websites.
Sentiment analysis software (IntenCheck) was initially
applied to the comments (after translation into English from
multiple languages) to identify themes from a random sam-
ple of 10 percent of the comments. Following initial evo-
lutions, ICSVE researchers then analyzed the comments
in-depth. Table 8 below contains a sample of dominant
themes by target country.
Table 8. Sample dominant themes by campaign.
Country Dominant Themes
Germany, France, & Belgium Pro-ISIS; Anti-United States &
Anti-Israel
Albania & Europe Efforts to distort Islam, Bashar
atrocities, solidarity for ISIS
Iraq & Lebanon ISIS as a vanguard of Islam,
pro-Shia and anti-Sunni
sentiments
The 16 campaigns generated a total of 5,110 post re-
actions, page likes, comments, and shares. Turkey, Iraq &
Lebanon, Bangladesh, and Middle East & Africa represent
campaigns with the most engagements. The target audi-
ence was comprised of individuals who, based on Facebook
signals, were believed to be vulnerable for exposure to ISIS
and other militant jihadi-driven extremist groups. The audi-
ence also included countries where ISIS and al Shabaab
had already successfully garnered supporters. Thus, it
was not surprising to find a significant number of posts
that included anti-United States and anti-Israel remarks,
especially in the Turkey, France & Belgium, and Albania
& Europe campaigns. In some regards, this is a positive
outcome, indicating that our counter narratives campaigns
were reaching to the target audiences and that the defector
videos were being watched by exactly the audiences ICSVE
researchers hoped to reach. Regardless of whether the
one-time exposure to a countering idea challenged them
enough to change their minds, it did reach them, neverthe-
less.
Some who commented also expressed disbelief in the
stories of the defectors featured in the counter narratives
and the campaign in general, calling into doubt whether it
was an actual ISIS insider speaking or a contrived video clip,
or viewing the clip as Islamophobic because it denounced
the activities of ISIS. Likewise, some pointed out the worse
(in their view) atrocities of the Assad government (See Table
7), or even of the U.S.-led coalition invasion in Iraq in 2003,
which, due to many circumstances, unleashed the rise of al
Qaeda in Iraq and later ISIS. Those commenting about the
U.S. often blamed the United States as the sole cause for
the emergence of ISIS, namely depicting it as much worse
than ISIS was, making it clear that much work lies ahead in
terms of counter narrative messaging.
In general, ICSVE researchers have repeatedly found in
face-to-face, focus group interventions conducted in multiple
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languages and cultures around the world that viewers, even
terrorists themselves, deem the videos credible. However,
some ISIS supporters will often attack in this manner on-
line, as it a convenient way to dispel the messaging. It also
underlines what many in the sample of 200+ defectors, re-
turnees, and imprisoned ISIS cadres have shared with ICSVE
researchers: ISIS instructed them not to believe mainstream
media and accounts denouncing the group. That some see
denouncing ISIS and their terrorist activities as Islamophobic
is troubling as well. Some commenters also expressed anger
at and underlined the guilt of the defectors featured in the
counter narrative for their time spent in support of ISIS and
for their nefarious deeds. A sampling of comments is below:
• comments: The Islamic state will remain,
God willing
Campaign: Turkey, Promises of ad-Dawlah to Women
• comments: Aman çok üzüldüm mk
çocuğu 5 tane bomba patlatmışsın. Senden kork-
sak bizide öldürecektin Türkiye ye gelecektin. Geber
oç bende müslümanım. Sünniyim yada her neyse...
Senin gibiler yüzünden birçok genç ateist oldu. Sen
kıyametin alametisin. Bebek öldürdün hepinizin mk.
(Translation: You set off 5 bombs. If we were afraid of
you, you would have killed us. You would have come
to Turkey. Die OC I’m Muslim too. I’m a Sunni or
whatever... a lot of young atheists have died because
of people like you. You are the sign of the apocalypse.
You killed a baby all of you mk.)
Campaign: Turkey, Rewards of Joining Islamic State
• replies: video
oyuncu ve gerçek değil .. insanları harekete geçirip
para ödemeye çağırıyorlar. bu video doğru değil. ka-
muoyunda hiçbir şeye inanma (Translation: This video
is acting and unreal.. They are calling people to act
and pay money. This video is not true. Don’t believe
anything in public.)
Campaign: Turkey, Rewards of Joining Islamic State
• : Kush qenka ai i palaço qe e spon-
sorizon kete video, i ashtequajtur “isis” ka koh qe
po venitet, edhe ne siri kohet e fundit ke masakra
dhe bombardime nga avionet rus dhe te ushtrise se
basharit qe kane vrare civil musliman te pafajshem,
avionet e putinhudhin bomba mbi spitale femijesh dhe
mediat ne bote heshtin, ushtria e basharit hudh arm
kimike mbi muslimanet dhe mediat heshtin, per nje
grupim qe sdihet si e mori hovin qe kan bere akte te
cuditshme neper bote dalin video te sponsorizuara
etiketohet islami (Translation: Who is sponsoring this
video, the so-called “Isis” has been fading away, even
recently in Syria there are massacres and bombings
by Russian aircraft and Bashar army who killed inno-
cent civilian Muslims, Putin’s airplanes drop bombs
on children’s hospitals and the media in the world are
silent, Bashar’s army drops the chemical weapons on
Muslims and the media are silent, for a group [ISIS]
that is not much known about how they emerged and
carried out strange acts around the world now emerge
sponsored videos that labels [attacks] Islam.
Campaign: Albania & Europe: Rewards of Joining
the Islamic State
• comments: Daesh une invention
israélienne. Pourquoi daesh n’attaque pas israël,
pourtant ils oppriment le peuple palestiniens ? (Trans-
lation: ISIS is an Israeli invention. Why Daesh does
not attack Israel, yet they will protect the Palestinian
people? ... replies: Toi
je suis sûr que tu perds plus de temps à dénoncer
les chiens de l’enfer plutôt que les américains qui
ont semé le chaos et la mort en envahissant un pays
tout entier et que tu passes ton temps à essayer
d’expliquer aux non musulmans qu’il ne faut pas faire
d’amalgame non? (Translation: I’m sure you’re wast-
ing more time denouncing “the dogs of hell” rather
than the Americans who sow chaos and death by in-
vading a whole country and spending your time trying
to explain to non-Muslims that you don’t have to make
an amalgam, right? Campaign: France, Rewards of
Joining the Islamic State
There were also comments in support of the ICSVE
campaigns, including anti-ISIS statements and comments
in opposition to terrorism and political violence in general.
A number of accounts spurred constructive dialogue among
interlocutors on ISIS and militant jihadi-driven extremism
after engaging with the counter narrative videos. Given the
nature of our target audience, these are significant interac-
tions and engagements and demonstrate the emotionally
evocative nature of the ICSVE counter narrative video clips
and their ability to create discourse. Below are some sam-
ple user comments in these regards:
• Comments- Kommt ein bischen spät
aber besser spät als nie (Translation: Arrives a bit
late [counternarrative] but better late than never).
Campaign: Germany, Promises of ad-Dawlah to
Women
• replies: bomba pat-
latıp insanları öldüren her şeye karşıyım (Transla-
tion: I’m against everything that
explodes bombs and kills people).
Campaign: Turkey, Rewards of Joining Islamic State
• comments:
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(Translation: Where is Muslim Khalifa? We have not
heard or seen him in a long time).
Campaign: Middle East & North Africa, My Brother in
the Islamic State
• replies: donc allez faire le
désordre et tuer des innocents c’est normal ?? (Trans-
lation: so go do the mess and kill in-
nocent people is normal?? replies:
ou tu a vu que je cautionne le terrorisme
(Translation: or did you see that I condone
terrorism?
Campaign: France & Belgium: Dreams of the Islamic
State
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4. Discussion
The purpose of these campaigns was to continue to raise
awareness and challenge narratives of extremist groups
such as ISIS, but to do so in hyper-focused samples judged
by prior analysis as vulnerable due to prior exposure to
terrorist recruiting content. Previously initiated ICSVE Face-
book campaigns focused on raising general awareness
about groups such as ISIS or included smaller datasets
of ISIS endorsers or sympathizers [17–21]. In contrast,
this research encompassed one of the largest data sets
by ICSVE that directly targeted users who were likely to
have been exposed to propaganda, such as that distributed
by those who sympathized or referenced a direct support
for militant jihadi, including ISIS and al Shabaab, violent
extremist groups on Facebook. There is ample evidence
that exposure to such propaganda can have a strong radi-
calizing effect on viewers. At the height of their reign, ISIS
recruiters would blanket the Internet with their content, then
use the immediate feedback mechanisms of social media
to immediately swarm in on and “love-bomb” anyone who
liked, shared, commented on, or otherwise responded to
their content. Recruiters were able to build strong and in-
timate relationships with their prey online, grooming them
and eventually convincing them either to travel abroad to
join ISIS in Iraq and Syria or to mount attacks at home [22].
While it is difficult to discern and report offline impacts
of the Facebook interventions across all 16 campaigns,
ICSVE applied a combination of awareness, engagement,
and impact analysis metrics to monitor and evaluate the
effectiveness of the Facebook campaigns. Engagement
metrics, such as thousands of comments and reactions gen-
erated throughout campaigns, for instance, offers a better
insight into the perceptions of the target audience vis-à-vis
the campaign, ISIS, and Islamist-driven violent extremism
in general. Given that, these campaigns targeted individu-
als whom ICSVE judged as vulnerable to ISIS recruitment
and propaganda exposure on Facebook, and not general
populations, anti-ISIS comments or comments praising the
campaign may indicate a measure of success, as do nega-
tive comments that demonstrate that ICSVE reached and
was able to engage and elicit strong emotional reactions
from exactly those individuals in need of such counter mes-
saging. Furthermore, it is important to point out potential
alternative explanations: That it may not be the content
of the counter narrative videos that motivated viewers to
comment or watch them, but rather mere curiosity, morbid
infatuation and a number of other possible factors.
In addition, comments analysis proved essential in iden-
tifying certain messaging themes that could inform the fu-
ture campaign directions. For example, in the case of the
Albania & Europe campaign target audience, efforts to dis-
tort Islam, the government of Assad’s atrocities, failure of
the West and the media to report Assad’s atrocities, and
the need for continued solidarity for ISIS as vanguards of
Islam dominated thematically. Comparatively speaking, in
the case of Belgium and France, anti-Israel, anti-United
States and comments warning about ISIS’ strength in re-
cruiting among the vulnerable stood out. Furthermore, a
significant number of those who watched the videos and/or
ended up clicking our link to the external website (ICSVE’s
TheRealJihad.org) responded by commenting, liking, and
sharing on the campaign. This indicates that the videos
sufficiently reached and engaged those who watched the
videos, which, arguably, is a positive sign, especially when
given the evidence that this audience was vulnerable to be-
ing exposed to ISIS propaganda materials and messaging
[12].
In some campaigns, such as Albania and Europe,
ICSVE researchers were able to access some user ac-
counts and analyze their profile and news feeds (e.g. reac-
tions to other videos, materials,) before and after viewing
the counter narratives to observe potential shifts in violent
extremist rhetoric. In this particular sample, after watch-
ing the counter narrative videos, some continued to praise
the Islamist-driven rhetoric, though clearly distancing them-
selves from terrorism and terrorist acts. In other accounts,
users changed their Facebook privacy settings (access to
profile and posts) from “Only You” (the account holder as
the only one who sees it) to “Friends” (only people who
are friends with the account holder) and “Public” (available
to anyone whether Facebook friends or not) after viewing
the counter narrative. This may be indicative of a potential
positive shift in online behavior. There were also others
who expressed likes for the campaign and were able to cul-
tivate constructive dialogue with other interlocutors on the
platform on the issue of ISIS, violent extremism, Islam, and
the counter narratives, as well as save (for later viewing)
and share the counter narratives with other Facebook mem-
bers. Previous ICSVE counter narrative campaigns have
demonstrated that Facebook users will occasionally share
the videos without watching them, believing the videos to be
ISIS propaganda. Therefore, not all shares indicate that the
person has changed his or her attitude regarding ISIS as
a result of watching the counter narrative video. However,
this unintentional dissemination of counter narrative mate-
rial nevertheless advances the overall goal of enhanced
engagement, as other Facebook users who may not have
otherwise been exposed to the counter narrative will have
the opportunity to view it after it has been shared by the un-
suspecting propagandist. The future targeting campaigns
might also focus on tracking the target audience’s online
behavior and communication, whenever possible, and in
other social media platforms, such as discussion forums
and blogs. While a larger sample of users are necessary
to infer potential changes in attitude or behavior, these are
promising indicators of success, nevertheless.
Comments also suggested a considerable amount of
interaction with the counter narratives throughout all 16
campaigns. Although important, focusing on comments
alone can often be misleading, as they represent a minority
of users in the total sample. In other words, it is important
to consider the vast majority of the sample participants who
chose not to comment. In this regard, ICSVE researchers
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exercised caution in not using comments to draw general
conclusions about the impact of the campaigns while also
taking them as a sign of at least some participants being en-
gaged enough to take the time to comment, argue, discuss,
which is also an indication of success [12]. Moreover, in the
authors’ view, insiders and formers are the most credible
sources of denouncing a terrorist group, because these
persons have similarly been attracted to and experienced
the group in reality [23]. They can convey compelling sto-
ries of their experiences inside a terrorist group, and in
language that is simple and appealing to vulnerable popu-
lations. While the research shows viewers can deprecate
even insider accounts online as fake, such accounts still ap-
pear to engage those deprecators enough that they watch
the video clips and take the time to comment on them. If
they had no impact, those who are commenting would likely
not bother to do so.
While direct behavioral shifts online could not be dis-
cerned, meaning no individual reached out to ICSVE re-
searchers directly seeking help or wishing to take the con-
versation offline, a number of effects, not necessarily ob-
servable in the comments section, were observed, possibly
suggesting changes in online attitudes and behavior or a
positive impact on online negative behavior [12]. For ex-
ample, share posts and link clicks to the external websites
(“Learn More”) such as ICSVE’s YouTube and TheRealJi-
had.org suggest engagement and indicate a positive impact
on targeting audience behavior online and bringing counter
narrative material to those judged as high-risk for exposure
to ISIS propagandists and their terrorist incitement and re-
cruitment messaging. In the case of Turkey, 10 percent
of the reached audience clicked and landed on the exter-
nal website (TheRealjihad.org). In the case of Africa, that
number reached 16 percent (See Table 5, under “Landing
page views”). The fact that some clicked on the external
link leading to ICSVE’s TheRealJihad.org website indicates
that the campaigns encouraged engagement on observ-
able online behavior, which is also a positive result. Equally
important, such actions reflect willingness on their end to
take additional step towards engaging with information that
may disagree with their viewpoint, considering the target
audience sample was composed of those with evidence of
vulnerability to ISIS propaganda, which may affect shifts
towards positive behavior both offline and online.
5. Conclusion
Groups such as ISIS maintain their presence online by
pushing a strategic and cohesive brand of power and con-
stantly shifting between communication platforms. Their
propaganda continues to draw in supporters and sympa-
thizers while also constantly adapting their messages and
adjusting phrasing and communication language to both
remain in touch with their support base and evade detection
by authorities. Methods by which they continue to reach
out and communicate with their support base remain pow-
erful even in the face of automated, machine learning and
sophisticated detection systems. As evidenced in this and
other ICSVE-initiated research, takedowns and disruptions
of violent extremist material and accounts can also be a
frustrating exercise, as these same actors often resurface
under different variations and monikers [10]. Their efforts
are also tenacious in that they manage to quickly alert and
redirect their network of supporters when social media plat-
forms become hostile toward them. Given that it is difficult
to eradicate violent extremist content online completely, it
is crucial to counter-messaging to challenge the terrorist
narrative and potentially drive their follower base down.
Private and public sector actors continue to disrupt
ISIS and other violent extremists’ groups’ presence online.
These actors have especially strengthened such efforts in
the years leading to ISIS’ territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria.
Social media platforms such as Facebook have made sig-
nificant efforts to flag and take down online violent extremist
content. There have also been efforts to report to law
enforcement worrying online trends. Although commend-
able, concerns over the threat of militant jihadists’ digital
presence remain real, as they continue to be present on
mainstream platforms.
This article details the utility of counter narratives in dis-
rupting ISIS’s online recruitment and indoctrination efforts
and in eliciting engagement from users most susceptible
to online exposure to terrorist propaganda, echoing previ-
ous ICSVE research [17–21]. This latest development in
counter narrative strategy, hyper-targeting Facebook pro-
files with the generous assistance of Facebook, demon-
strates that ICSVE’s counter narratives are even more ef-
fective in engaging members of the target audience than
the general population, which gives validity to their effi-
cacy as powerful counter messaging tools and ICSVE’s
methods in distributing them online. Future developments,
including shortening the videos to one minute in order to
increase the complete view rate, will likely further enhance
the counter narratives’ ability to effectively refute and dis-
credit ISIS online as complete view rates will likely increase
with shorter videos. This research aimed at hyper-targeting
those vulnerable to ISIS recruitment with counter narratives
is an important step demonstrating not only the efficacy of
counter narratives, but the impact of strong working relation-
ships between large social media companies (Facebook)
and non-governmental organizations (ICSVE). In order to
effectively counter ISIS and other terrorist groups online,
it is crucial that experts from a variety of sectors work in
concert.
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